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CASES NOTED
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
REQUIREMENT OF A FILING FEE - Wetherington v. Adams,
309 F. Supp. 318 (N.D. Fla. 1970).- Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that a Florida statute, requiring a candidate for state office to pay a
$300 filing fee before his name could be placed on the primary ballot
violated the due process and equal protection dauses of the 14th amendment. The district court relied upon Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 7
(1943), for the rule that "an unlawful denial by state action of the right to
hold a state political office" does not violate the due process clause. The
court also rejected the equal protection challenge, holding that a state has a
valid interest in limiting the number of candidates for state offices in order
to avoid overburdening its election machinery, and in promoting the growth
of political parties which receive the bulk of the collected fees.
This decision is questionable in light of Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), which added wealth to the list of criteria
which are suspect when used by states to make statutory classifications.
After Harper, wealth may only be used as a basis for such classification if
the state can show a "compelling interest" and meet the strict scrutiny established in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). In light of alternative means available to Florida for protection of its election process, such
as signature collection, it is doubtful that the statute can meet the stricter
standard.
ELECTIONS -

EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAws -

ONE MAN, ONE VOTE PRINCIPLE

Hadley v. Junior College District, 397 U.S. 50 (1970).- Appellants, residents of a school district which had voted to consolidate with several others
to form a junior college district, challenged the constitutionality of the
statutory apportionment formula governing the election of the college district's trustees. The appellants' local district, containing 60 percent of the
total school-age population of the college district, was entitled to elect only
three trustees, or 50 percent of the six-member board. In rejecting the
appellees' contentions that the "one man, one vote" principle should not
apply to "less important" elections, nor to the election of administrative
officials, the Supreme Court held that the election of trustees of a junior
college district must be apportioned such that the appellants' votes are given
the same weight as that of any other voter.
Although this extension of the rule may allow less flexibility in structuring local governmental units which perform specialized functions, the
principle of one man, one vote is not without limitation. Whether a
single-purpose agency falls outside this mandate will depend upon how far
it is "removed from normal governmental activities" and whether it disproportionately affects different groups within electoral boundaries.
FREEDOM OF SPEECH Tanner v. Lloyd Corp.,
308 F. Supp. 128 (D. Ore. 1970).- Several orderly war protesters were
barred from distributing handbills on a privately owned shopping mall
open to the general public. Defendant contended that the exclusion was
constitutionally permissible since the distribution did not relate to a business
purpose of the center. The court held that the first amendment requires
FIRST AMENDMENT -
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that when one invites the general public on his property for business purposes, he gives up the right to prohibit the distribution of literature or to
decide what kinds of literature may be distributed thereon.
Although the Supreme Court, in Food Employees v. Logan Valley
Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968), extended the freedom of speech protection to privately owned shopping centers, it left unanswered the question
whether an owner could bar picketing which was not directly related to the
use of the center. In a case of first impression the federal district court
of Oregon replied in the negative, and thus extended Logan Valley by denying any censorship rights to the private shopping center owner where the
distribution is peaceful. This decision firmly establishes the supremacy
of the first amendment freedom of expression over the concept of private
property.
FIRsT AND FIFTH AMENDMENTS - CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORs - U.S.
v. Bower, 307 F. Supp. 1094 (N.D. Cal. 1969).- Defendant believed that
Roman Catholic doctrine required him to distinguish between just and unjust wars. In accordance with that belief, he determined that the Vietnam
war was unjust and refused induction. His refusal questioned the constitutionality of section 6(j) of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50
U.S.C. § 456(j) (Supp. III, 1967), which,- in according conscientious objector status, distinguishes between persons who object to war in any form
and those who selectively object. The court found that since there was no
compelling governmental interest for the distinction, the denial of conscientious objector status to a registrant solely on the ground that he failed
to oppose all wars was in violation of both the establishment clause of the
first amendment and the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
In addition to concluding that the first amendment insures to an individual with religious reservations against certain wars the opportunity to
qualify for conscientious objector status, this decision takes the further
step - logical but perhaps unnecessary - of declaring freedom of religion to be a fundamental right. While no one has seriously contended that
the enumerated rights contained in the first amendment are not fundamental,
most courts have relied directly on that amendment to strike down any
statutory classification infringing upon the specified rights, -rather than
adopt the fundamental rights doctrine which has traditionally been utilized
to safeguard unenumerated or penumbral rights derived from the Bill of
Rights.
VOTING RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS - STANDING TO SUE - Hall v.
Beals, 396 U.S. 45 (1969).- The plaintiffs, ineligible by 1 month to vote
in the November 1968 presidential election, brought a class action challenging the constitutionality of Colorado's 6-month residency require-,
ment for voting. The three-judge federal district court denied relief,
and during the intervening time while the case was on appeal the election
date passed and Colorado reduced its residence requirement to 2 months.
The Supreme Court reasoned that because the plaintiffs now met the new
residency requirement the case was moot. Mr. Justice Marshall, dissenting,
chose to discuss the merits of the case. In Drueding v. Devlin, 380 U.S.
125 (1965), aff'g 234 F. Supp. 712 (D.C. Md. 1964), the Court had
affirmed a decision sustaining a 1-year residency requirement. Mr. Justice
Marshall thought that Drueding was no longer good law because the district court had applied a "rational relationship" test, and since Harper v.
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Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 633 (1966), a state must show a
"compelling interest" before it can restrict the right to vote. Reviewing
Colorado's justifications for the residency requirements, he found no compelling interest and concluded that the state's 2-month requirement violated the 14th amendment.
If the Supreme Court decides to face such an issue in the future, it is
likely that Mr. Justice Marshall's condusion may be adopted by the majority
in light of the Court's reasoning in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969), and the fact that voting residency requirements may also impede the
fundamental right to travel. See 21 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 571 (1970).
FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE
IN GENERAL Thayer v. Liggett &
Myers Tobacco Co., 38 U.S.L.W. 2453 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 10, 1970).Plaintiff sought damages from a cigarette manufacturer, alleging that her
husband's death from lung cancer was caused by the defendant's product.
Knowing of defendant's intent to rely on expert testimony concerning scientific and medical data, plaintiff attempted to utilize discovery techniques
to gather information about payments made by defendant and other members of the Tobacco Institute to various experts. Recognizing the policy of
broad discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the value
that establishing pecuniary relationships between defendant and the experts based on payments for past services would have on plaintiff's ability
to attack the experts' credibility, the court allowed plaintiff to pursue the
desired information.
By permitting the use of discovery machinery to include prior industryexpert witness relationships, the court substantially increased the scope of
permissible discovery. This may be particularly significant in actions involving large corporate parties whose vast economic resources permit them
to subtly nurture loyalty from experts through a pecuniary interest.
DEPOSITIONS AND DISCOVERY -

LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

MISMANAGEMENT

-

LIMITED PARTNER'S RIGHT To SUE

-

Blattberg

v. Weiss, 61 Misc. 2d 564, 306 N.Y.S. 2d 88 (Sup. Ct. 1969).- Plaintiffs,
several limited partners of a syndicated real estate partnership, sought to recover damages on their own behalf for loss suffered by the partnership
entity resulting from wrongful acts of defendant general partners. The
court held, as a matter of law, that although a limited partner does have a
right to bring a class or derivative action involving partnership affairs, the
common law rule that partners cannot sue one another over the concerns of
the partnership effectively barred a suit brought by a partner in his individual capacity.
This decision comports with the principle articulated in Riviera Congress Ass'n v. Yassky, 18 N.Y.2d 540, 223 N.E.2d 876, 277 N.Y.S.2d
386 (1966), that for the purpose of determining the rights of parties,
the relationship between general and limited partners is to be considered
similar to that which exists between corporate directors and their shareholders.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
ZONING - VALIDITY OF RESOLUTIONS - RESTRICTIONS ON MULTIPLE
DWELLINGS In re Girsh, 38 U.S.L.W. 2465 (Pa. Sup. Ct. Feb. 13,

1970).-

A Pennsylvania township refused to provide for apartment de-
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velopment in its zoning scheme. In response to a challenge that such a
land-use restriction was unreasonable, the township argued that a variance
could be obtained upon a showing that the property was subject to a unique
hardship. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reaffirmed National Land &
Inv. Co. v. Easttown Twp. Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d
597 (1965), noting that "a zoning ordinance whose primary purpose is
to prevent the entrance of newcomers in order to avoid future burdens, economic and otherwise" on the township is invalid.
Municipalities have used a number of zoning devices, such as minimum
lot size requirements and prohibitions of multiple-family dwellings, to
keep their communities homogeneous. This decision echoes the refusal of
a number of courts to accept the specious argument that a municipality promotes the "public welfare" by keeping its expenses at a minimum, at the
cost of depriving our growing population of adequate housing.
NEGLIGENCE

ACTS

OR OMISSIONS

CONSTITUTING NEGLIGENCE -

NEGLIGENT MISREP-

Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 276 Cal. App. 2d 820, 81 Cal.
Rptr. 519 (1969).- In an action by a shoe purchaser for personal injuries
sustained when she slipped and fell while wearing the new shoes, the plaintiff sought to hold the defendant, publisher of Good Housekeeping Magazine, liable for negligent misrepresentation through its advertisement endorsing the product. In reversing the lower court and finding a valid cause of
action, the court of appeals concluded that a person who publically endorses
products as "good ones" has a duty of ordinary care to insure that such a
commendation is accurate. The action was remanded for determination of
whether the shoes in question were, in fact, inferior to representations made
by the defendant.
Although recovery under products liability was formerly confined to the
manufacturer or retailer, this decision suggests that unless a person or institution exercises reasonable care to determine whether the goods they endorse or advertise are of the quality represented, they may be fully liable
for any resulting injuries. This precedent should have a significant impact on the many institutions and individuals that publicly endorse products.
RESENTATION -

IMPACT RULE - Niederman v. Brodsky, ___ Pa. ___, 261
A.2d 84 (1970).- While walking with his son, appellant witnessed an
accident wherein his son was injured when defendant's vehicle skidded
onto the sidewalk and struck the boy. Although defendant's car made no
actual impact with appellant, the father was hospitalized for 5 weeks with
diagnosed heart ailments, which he attributed to the fright and shock attendant at the accident. The lower court, following the impact rule,
denied recovery for negligence. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed, holding that damages could be recovered even though defendant's
vehicle did not make physical contact with the appellant. The court
reasoned that the arguments supporting the impact rule were no longer persuasive because of medical advances in locating the source of traumatic
injury, the incongruity of using medical proof to establish a causal connection between emotional trauma and bodily injuries in cases of minor impact
but not in cases of no impact, and because the judicial process offered adequate protections against exaggerated and fraudulent claims.
Although eliminating the impact rule, the Pennsylvania decision appears to limit recovery of damages for injury through fright to those in-
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stances where a negligent force is directed at a person, placing him in personal danger of physical impact and where he actually did fear the force.
REAL PROPERTY
IMPLIED WARRANTY Rothberg v. Olenik, 38
U.S.L.W. 2479 (Vt. Sup. Ct. Feb. 3, 1970).- Plaintiff had signed a
house sale contract before the structure was complete and before title had
passed. Many latent structural defects appeared after occupancy resulting
in severe damage to the property. The plaintiff asserted that a buildervendor impliedly warrants the structural fitness of the house in the contract
of sale. Relying upon precedents from other jurisdictions and recognizing
the inability of the purchaser to detect such defects, the Supreme Court of
Vermont applied the doctrine of implied warranty to the sales of houses
and found the defendants liable.
The decision continues the departure from the harsh doctrine of caveat
emptor in the sale of new homes. This court plus six others have found
implied warranties with respect to the builder-vendors of houses, theorizing that since the builders and purchasers are not on equal footing the
purchaser tends to rely upon the builder's expertise. It is likely that these
decisions will persuade other jurisdictions to adopt the implied warranty
approach, and may signal the demise of caveat emptor in the real property
context.
BUILDER'S LIABILITY -

SECURITIES REGULATION
OF ACTION UNDER RULE lob-5 STATUTE
Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir.
1970).- Plaintiffs asserted an implied private right of action for violations
of fraud Rule 10b-5 promulgated pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964). Although they had complied with the 3-year statute of limitations for common law fraud, they had
failed to come within the 2-year limit contained in Arkansas' blue sky law.
While remanding for a decision as to precisely when the plaintiffs discovered, or should have discovered the alleged fraud, the court held that
the state's blue sky law statute of limitations should control. Acknowledging that the Arkansas blue sky law and the federal statute are not identical,
the court found them to be similar in that both were specifically directed
at security fraud, and both were intended to cover negligent actions.
In holding that the statute of limitations contained in state blue sky
laws controls a private right of action brought under the Securities Exchange
Act, the Eighth Circuit has agreed with a growing number of jurisdictions
that controvert the majority rule of Charney v. Thomas, 372 F.2d 97
(6th Cir. 1967), that the state's statute of limitations for common law fraud
is applicable.
ALLEGED FEDERAL

CAUSE

OF LIMITATIONS -

ANTIFRAUD VIOLATIONS
INSIDE INFORMATION CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.

-

MISLEADING

PRESS RELEASE AND USE

OF

SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., [Current Binder]
5 92,572, at 98,584 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 1970).On remand from the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the district
court was required to determine: (1) Whether a press release issued by
the defendant would mislead the reasonable investor; (2) whether the defendant exercised due diligence in issuing the press release; and (3) what
penalty should be imposed upon the individual defendants who had pur-
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chased TGS stock or accepted stock options in reliance on undisclosed information. After finding that a reasonable investor exercising ordinary
care would have been misled and that the corporate insiders failed to exercise due diligence in disclosing material information, the court ordered the
individual defendants to pay into escrow the profits they realized by buying
or receiving TGS stock while in possession of the undisclosed information.
This decision marks the first application of the due diligence test to
information disclosures, looking to the facts held by corporate officials at
the time public representation was made. In requiring the disgorgment of
profits realized on the basis of inside information, the court applied the
remedy it had recently established under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78j (b) (1964), in SEC v. Golconda Mining Co., [Current Binder] CCH FE. SEc. L. REP. 5 92,504 at 98,357
(S.D.N.Y. 1969).
CHURNING Pierce v. Richard Ellis & Co.,
38 U.S.L.W. 2433 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Jan. 20, 1970).- By churning plaintiff's $3000 discretionary account, including the trading of the same security
15 times within 8 days, one of defendant's brokers generated $1000 in
commissions and reduced the value of the account to $110. Additionally,
evidence was introduced indicating that the defendant delayed covering
a short sale and deceptively reported the transactions to the customer. In a
common law constructive fraud action for breach of fiduciary duty, the
court found for the plaintiff and awarded damages in the amount of his
original investment, interest, and commissions paid.
In granting this measure of damage, the court relied on the rule enunciated in Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Va.
1968), that in a fraud action the court may choose the character of the
damages to be awarded. The court noted that to limit damages to a restoration of commissions where the capital of the account was dissipated
would "encourage this conduct as low risk larceny."
BROKERS AND DEALERS -

TENDER OFFER -

DISCLOSURE OF MERGER PLAN OR PROPOSAL -

Sus-

quehanna Corp. v. Pan American Sulfur Co., [Current Binderi CCH FED.

SEC. L. REP. 5 92, 610, at 98, 749 (5th Cir Mar. 13, 1970).- Susquehanna,
when attempting by tender offer to take over the appellee, had continuously
represented in its original and amended schedule 13D, filed pursuant to section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)
(Supp. IV, 1969), that it did not "plan or propose to merge the target corporation." A day after the last schedule was filed, Susquehanna proposed
to a third corporation that it merge into Pan American. This offer was never
replied to by the third corporation and was soundly denounced by the target.
The district court, finding that the appellant had failed to disclose material
information in violation of section 13 (d), enjoined the offeror from voting
shares acquired in the tender offer. Vacating the injunction and dismissing
the suit, the court of appeals concluded that since the merger was only a
"unilateral offer to negotiate," to include it as a plan or proposal of merger
would have been more misleading to the target's shareholders.
This decision, coupled with Electronic Speciality Co. v. International
Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969), evidences a tendency by
appellate courts to liberally interpret the disclosure requirement in the new
tender offer legislation. Still to be decided is whether a tender offeror's
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intention of using the target's cash assets for some future merger or acquisition is within the reach of section 13(d).
STANDING TO SuE - Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 38 U.S.L.W.
2466 (3d Cir. Feb. 20, 1970).Plaintiff, a nontendering minority
shareholder, brought a class action for an injunction and attorney's fees,
alleging that the controlling shareholder and tender offeror had materially
misrepresented and failed to disclose the true nature of the offering price
in violation of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964), and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1969).
The district court dismissed the petition for attorney's fees because plaintiff
was not a purchaser or seller of securities and, therefore lacked the requisite standing to show that he relied upon the misrepresentation. The Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that the strict
purchaser-seller rule of Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952), applied to actions for damages but not to claims for equitable relief. The court rationalized its expansion of standing by an analogy to Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396
U.S. 375 (1970), which held that proof of reliance is not an independent
element which must be established in addition to a showing of materiality.
Further, the court followed another aspect of the Mills holding when it
ruled that although the instant litigation would not produce a fund from
which to award counsel fees, the target corporation (a nominal defendant)
itself derived sufficient benefit from the plaintiff's activities to warrant
directing it to reimburse plaintiff for those fees.
The court has broken new ground in the area of implied rights under
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by according standing to nontendering shareholders, a group embraced by neither the statute nor the rule. By so holding, the court demonstrated its agreement with the Second Circuit's ruling
in Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967),
wherein the court emphasized the -important policing function accomplished
by injunctive actions brought by "interested" individuals.
TENDER OFFER -

SOCIAL SECURrIY
FAMILY ASSISTANCE

-

VALIDITY

OF STATE

LIMITATIONS ON WELFARE

Dandridge v. Williams, 38 U.S.L.W. 4277 (U.S. April
6, 1970).- Welfare disbursements under Maryland's Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) statute are determined by need, based
on number of children and family living conditions, and are limited by a
maximum disbursement. Petitioners challenged this statutory formula on
the grounds that it was violative of the equal protection clause of the 14th
amendment. Passing on this issue, the Supreme Court, noting that federal
law grants each state great latitude in the administration of its AFDC payments [42 U.S.C. § 601 (1964)], reasoned that this, nevertheless, did not
permit the state to impose a system of invidious discrimination. However,
finding that none of the petitioners' fundamental rights were at stake, the
Court held that Maryland need only show a rational basis for its statutory
classification. The Court found that Maryland had made such a showing.
Although the Court gave express recognition to the fiscal probems facing the states, the standard applied in determining whether the state action was constitutionally permissible seems to retreat from the Court's
prior position in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), wherein it
ALLOWANCES -
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held that state classifications based on wealth could only be sustained by
showing a compelling state interest.
THREE-JUDGE COURTS
28 U.S.C. § 2281 -

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS -

Gold v. Lomenzo, 38
U.S.L.W. 2430 (2d Cir. Jan. 22, 1970).- Appellant, a real estate broker,
applied for a hearing before a three-judge federal district court, alleging
that the New York Secretary of State's administrative order limiting brokers'
commissions was confiscatory in nature. Upon finding that appellant's
contention raised a substantial constitutional question to warrant the invocation of a three-judge court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1964), the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the district judge was without
power to deny the preliminary injunction, and reversed and remanded the
denial of such hearing.
By assuming jurisdiction itself to reverse the lower court, the court of
appeals adheres to the current trend away from the stringent rule of Stratton
v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 282 U.S. 10 (1930), which had indicated that the
only remedy for the improper denial of a three-judge court was a writ
mandamus to the Supreme Court. Additionally, the court reaffirmed the
long-established rule that section 2281 was intended to scrutinize both
allegedly unconstitutional state statutes and questionable administrative
orders issued under patently constitutional statutes.
TRUSTS
STOCK OF ISSUER HELD IN FmUCIARY CAPACITY -

1RIGHT TO VOTE

FOR DmECTORS - Cleveland Trust Co. v. Eaton, 21 Ohio St. 2d 129, 256
N.E.2d 198 (1970).
Cleveland Trust sought a declaratory judgment to
enable it to vote its own shares held by it as trustee in a trust created prior
to January 1, 1968. The Ohio Supreme Court held that a recently enacted
statute permitted the vote. The statute, OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1109.10
(Page 1968), allows banks to vote their shares held in trust under certain
circumstances, notwithstanding a general statutory prohibition against corporations voting their shares. Those circumstances, for shares held by trusts
created after January 1, 1968, include authorization by the beneficiaries.
For trusts created prior to January 1, 1968, the vote must be conducted according to "any provisions of law applicable." Finding no statute preventing such a vote, the court held that neither the common law of trusts nor
that of corporations supplied a prohibition.
While the court's reasoning with respect to corporate law has merit, it
fails to grasp the potential for trustee conflict of interest between loyalty
to the beneficiaries and allegiance to its own management. This potential
is minimized by section 1109.10's requirement that beneficiaries of postJanuary 1, 1968 trusts must authorize the vote. However, for pre-January
1, 1968 trusts there is no such protection. In fact, the corporate trustee
by acquiring its own shares could easily serve management's wishes under
the guise of discharging its fiduciary function.
WATER AND WATER COURSES
- POLLUTION - Nelson v. C. & C. Plywood Corp.,
38 U.S.L.W. 2464 (Mont. Sup. Ct. Feb. 13, 1970).- The well water in
plaintiff's area was naturally high in iron and magnesium, but not unpalat-
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able unless there were sufficient phenols in the water to form a precipitate.
Expert testimony demonstrated that the glue dumped by neighboring defendant into sumps and wells on his property released phenols which percolated through the soil into plaintiff's water supply, thus rendering it
unsuitable for drinking. Defendant relied upon the common law rule,
which provided that the proprietor of soil on which percolating water is
found has the right to use and control the soil as he pleases, even though
such use may injure adjoining property. Holding for the plaintiff, the
Montana Supreme Court found the common law rule was based on outmoded scientific understanding since modem hydrological innovations
have made possible the accurate tracing of underground water.
By its action, the court has brought an end to the common law rule of
percolating water in Montana and established an important precedent in the
fight against pollution.

